Ukraine, Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: Can Crises Be Traded Off?

The meeting between US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen, China, on 19 November 2026 was no ordinary diplomatic encounter. Held on the sidelines of the 33rd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, it brought together the leaders of three powers that wield decisive influence over the international military and economic balance yet remain divided over the future of the international order and compete for markets, technological supremacy and geopolitical influence.
Shenzhen’s role as host carried significance beyond the symbolism of the venue. A city that has emerged over recent decades as one of China’s foremost industrial and technological centres was hosting an economic summit under the theme “Building an Asia-Pacific Community for Common Prosperity”, bringing together economies that account for a substantial share of global trade and production.
Trade, investment, innovation and economic integration might ordinarily have dominated the agenda. Instead, wars, sanctions and geopolitical tensions asserted themselves throughout the discussions.
The irony was difficult to overlook. The very powers gathered to promote economic cooperation are also deploying sanctions, tariffs, technological restrictions and energy as instruments of pressure and political coercion. Yet the continued use of these measures is exposing costs that extend far beyond their intended targets, disrupting global markets and supply chains, weakening investment and diminishing growth opportunities worldwide.
Instruments that should serve as engines of economic growth and prosperity have increasingly become weapons of geopolitical confrontation, with the countries deploying them unable to insulate their own economies fully from the consequences. Economic power, when weaponised in international disputes, can therefore undermine the global economy from which the major powers derive a considerable part of their influence.
Against this backdrop, the trilateral meeting raised a question extending well beyond the future of US–China–Russia relations: can the major powers turn their respective crises into bargaining chips, easing tensions without surrendering their strategic interests?
The war in Ukraine, the Iranian crisis and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz attracted particular speculation, not least because each is directly or indirectly bound up with the interests of all three powers.

A Historic Summit — But Where Was the Grand Bargain?

The trilateral meeting opened in a diplomatic atmosphere that appeared markedly different from the confrontational rhetoric that has characterised relations among the three powers in recent years.
Trump described the gathering as a historic moment, arguing that peace could not be achieved by passing up opportunities for engagement. Putin spoke of numerous shared interests in resolving regional conflicts, including the war in Ukraine, while Xi emphasised the importance of understanding among the major powers, suggesting that history had demonstrated how harmony between them could contribute to world peace.
Yet the apparent convergence in diplomatic language did not translate into agreement on the most contentious issues.
The meeting concluded with a joint declaration addressing United Nations reform, increased supplies of refined petroleum products, nuclear risks and non-proliferation, and the immunity of state officials. It offered no settlement of either the war in Ukraine or the Iranian crisis.
These outcomes should not be dismissed. Nevertheless, they fell short of the strategic grand bargain that had been the subject of speculation ahead of the summit.
Affirming the need to prevent nuclear war is not equivalent to agreeing to reduce nuclear arsenals. Calling for stable energy supplies does not amount to establishing arrangements that guarantee safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Nor does a commitment to UN reform, by itself, reveal the nature of the reforms on which the three powers might agree.
The provision concerning the immunity of state officials offers another insight into the character of the understandings reached. It touches on disputes involving international law and the International Criminal Court, including the arrest warrant issued for the Russian president. A political declaration, however, does not in itself alter existing obligations under international law.
The absence of a grand bargain does not mean that the summit achieved nothing. It reopened channels of direct communication among powers competing across several arenas and demonstrated a willingness to identify common interests on specific issues, even as disagreements persisted over the most difficult questions.
From this perspective, Shenzhen was significant as much for exposing the limits of what the major powers could agree upon as for revealing their reasons for seeking agreement.

Ukraine: Shared Interests Do Not Amount to a Common Settlement

Russia arrived at the Shenzhen summit determined to consolidate its position as an indispensable participant in any future European security arrangements. Moscow regards the war in Ukraine not merely as a territorial dispute but as a confrontation over Russia’s place in Europe’s security architecture, the future of Western sanctions and the limits of American influence in its strategic neighbourhood.
The United States faces a different set of calculations. The continuation of the war drains Western political and military resources, complicates relations with Moscow and constrains Washington’s ability to concentrate its strategic attention on competition with China.
Among the most striking Russian statements was Putin’s acknowledgement, at the opening of the trilateral meeting, that Russia, the United States and China shared interests in resolving regional conflicts, including the war in Ukraine.
The significance of this remark lies in the possibility that Moscow envisages a settlement framework extending beyond bilateral negotiations with Washington, potentially allowing China a role in the wider international arrangements surrounding the conflict.
Such diplomatic openness, however, does not imply that Moscow is prepared to retreat from its fundamental demands.
The Kremlin confirmed that Ukraine had been the principal subject of the bilateral discussions between Trump and Putin and that the Russian president had left the meeting in a positive frame of mind. No specific understandings were announced on a ceasefire, sanctions or security guarantees.
Trump, meanwhile, appeared keen to present direct dialogue as a means of overcoming disagreements. He described Putin as a friend and expressed optimism that renewed talks could produce positive results.
Yet reliance on personal relationships between leaders will have limited effect unless it translates into understandings on the substantive issues, particularly territory, sanctions and security guarantees.
The war in Ukraine cannot be settled simply by improving relations between Washington and Moscow. It is a conflict in which the interests of Ukraine, Europe, Russia and the United States are deeply intertwined.
This exposes the first major obstacle to the idea of trading concessions across crises. Russia might be willing to cooperate on other international issues in exchange for gains in Ukraine, but the United States cannot unilaterally provide all the guarantees Moscow seeks.
Any settlement involving sovereignty and territory also requires Ukraine’s consent, while European countries retain direct security interests and independent authority over certain sanctions.
Consequently, however politically significant a US–Russian rapprochement might be, it would not be sufficient to deliver a comprehensive European settlement.
Perhaps Russia’s most important gain from the summit was its return to high-level negotiations with Washington and Beijing, strengthening Moscow’s international standing without necessarily bringing a breakthrough in the conditions for ending the war.

Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: Common Interests, Divergent Approaches

If the Russia–Ukraine war represents a test of Europe’s security balance, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz tests the ability of the major powers to protect the global economy from the consequences of regional conflict.
Disruption to navigation through the strait affects far more than oil and gas exports. Its repercussions extend to freight and insurance costs, commodity and fertiliser prices, and ultimately industrial and agricultural production in importing economies.
These consequences become particularly dangerous when they coincide with a global economic slowdown or rising financing costs. Under such circumstances, the shock is not confined to energy prices but spreads to consumption, investment and international trade.
China occupies an especially vulnerable position. As the world’s largest importer of crude oil, it relies heavily on uninterrupted energy supplies from the Gulf to sustain large parts of its industrial economy. Continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz therefore represents not a distant political crisis for Beijing but a direct threat to production costs and industrial competitiveness.
This convergence of interests was evident during the bilateral meeting between Trump and Xi in Shenzhen, ahead of the trilateral summit.
Trump stated that the United States and China shared an interest in ensuring the continued flow of energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, stressing that both countries attached considerable importance to these objectives.
The Chinese response, however, carried a different emphasis. In his public remarks, Xi did not explicitly endorse the American formulation concerning Iran. Instead, he concentrated on maintaining stability in US–China relations, sustaining cooperation and managing disagreements between the two countries.
This does not mean that China opposes nuclear non-proliferation or uninterrupted energy supplies. Rather, it points to Beijing’s determination not to allow shared interests to become an open-ended endorsement of American policy towards Tehran.
China recognises that stability in the Strait of Hormuz is an economic necessity. It does not necessarily regard military pressure and sanctions as the most effective means of achieving it.
This reveals one of the central contradictions confronting the Shenzhen summit. Washington seeks to use shared economic interests to secure greater Chinese cooperation on Iran, while Beijing attempts to distinguish agreement on objectives from commitment to the American methods proposed to achieve them.
Energy security was equally prominent in the Russian position. During the trilateral meeting, Putin called for discussions encompassing economic issues, food security and energy security, signalling that the management of international crises can no longer be separated from the stability of global markets and supplies.
A notable convergence therefore emerged among the three leaders. Trump emphasised the shared American and Chinese interest in uninterrupted energy flows through Hormuz and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, while Putin placed energy and food security among the priorities of international dialogue.
Yet this convergence is insufficient to conclude that Moscow and Beijing endorsed American policy towards Iran, or that the three powers reached an understanding on the future of the conflict.
What unites them is their recognition of the economic costs of global disruption. What divides them is their assessment of how crises should be resolved and how the benefits of any settlement should be distributed.
China is seeking to protect its Gulf interests through two parallel approaches: pursuing understandings with the major powers on energy stability while strengthening direct relationships with regional states, thereby avoiding dependence on any single international agreement for the security of its supplies.
Oman occupies a particularly important place in this calculation, given its geographical position and diplomatic relationships, which enable it to maintain contact with opposing parties. Stronger Chinese–Omani cooperation in energy, investment and technology forms part of Beijing’s broader effort to expand its economic and diplomatic presence in the region.
Russia’s interests are more complicated. Higher oil prices may benefit some of its exports, while prolonged disruption could weaken global demand and intensify pressure on the international economy, including countries with which Moscow maintains substantial trading relationships.
These calculations demonstrate that Washington, Beijing and Moscow may agree on the need for stability in the Strait of Hormuz without necessarily agreeing on how to achieve it.
Crucially, Iran retains its own security and political calculations. Neither China nor Russia can provide definitive guarantees on Tehran’s behalf, and Washington cannot assume that concessions to Moscow would automatically alter Iran’s position.
The Hormuz crisis may therefore become a bargaining chip in wider negotiations, but it cannot be traded independently of the parties directly involved.

From Ukraine to Hormuz: Why Has the Grand Bargain Proved So Elusive?

The logic behind a potential grand bargain appears straightforward: Russia secures progress on Ukraine in exchange for cooperation in reducing tensions with Iran, while China uses its economic influence to support stability in the Gulf in return for an easing of American trade and technological restrictions.
Yet this proposition assumes that the three powers attach comparable strategic value to the respective crises and are prepared to exchange concessions across them. The reality is considerably more complex.
Russia regards Ukraine as an immediate national security issue. China, by contrast, sees stability in trade, technology and energy as more closely connected to its long-term economic growth.
The United States is attempting to reconcile objectives that may at times conflict: containing China, managing relations with Russia, preventing Iran from strengthening its military capabilities and preserving global economic stability.
The concessions involved also differ fundamentally in character. A suspension of tariffs may be reversed within months, whereas arrangements involving territory or military guarantees may be long-lasting and difficult to amend.
Economic agreements are also more readily measurable than political or security commitments. The value of trade purchases or the scale of tariff reductions can be quantified. Measuring the influence Russia or China might exert over decisions taken in Tehran is considerably harder.
The failure to reach a comprehensive deal in Shenzhen does not therefore necessarily represent a failure of diplomacy. Rather, it exposes the limits of bargaining across issues that differ in their strategic importance and character for the parties concerned.
The more realistic outcome may be the continuation of negotiations along relatively separate tracks, with opportunities to link them where clear interests and enforceable incentives emerge.

Nvidia and Rare Earths: When Technology Becomes an Economic Weapon

While the three leaders discussed the future of international relations, developments in the technology sector offered a practical illustration of the economic rivalry between Washington and Beijing.
Nvidia, the American company at the forefront of artificial intelligence chip manufacturing, reportedly underwent a significant leadership change following the resignation of its founder and chief executive, Jensen Huang, and the appointment of chief financial officer Colette Kress as interim chief executive, according to a company announcement dated 12 November.
These developments occurred amid controversy over compliance with advanced semiconductor export controls and investigations into the possible transfer of sensitive American technology to China through intermediaries in third countries. Allegations involving espionage or personal misconduct, however, should not be treated as established judicial findings.
The episode illustrates a deeper transformation in the relationship between governments and technology companies. Major corporations can no longer operate solely according to considerations of profitability and market share. They must increasingly balance commercial interests against national security requirements and restrictions on technology transfers.
This shift is particularly consequential for Nvidia, whose advanced chips have become essential components of artificial intelligence infrastructure. Additional restrictions on exporting these chips, or making them available through cloud computing services, could reshape competition between American and Chinese companies and influence investment decisions across the sector.
China, meanwhile, possesses different sources of leverage, notably its influential position in rare earth processing and the production of materials essential to electronics, electric vehicles and defence technologies.
Restrictions on exports of these minerals, together with decisions to suspend certain controls or extend exemptions, have become part of the broader trade negotiations with Washington.
The paradox is clear. The United States seeks to protect its lead in semiconductors and artificial intelligence, while China can influence the supply chains on which numerous Western industries depend.
Yet the use of these instruments does not guarantee a net advantage for either side. American restrictions may encourage Chinese companies to accelerate the development of domestic alternatives, while Chinese controls may prompt Western firms to diversify mineral supplies and invest in new processing capacity outside China.
In this way, measures that yield short-term negotiating advantages may, over time, erode the economic interdependence from which both countries have derived part of their strength.
Shenzhen and the Digital Economy: A Contest to Shape the Rules of the Future
China’s economic message at the APEC summit extended beyond calls for trade openness. Beijing sought to highlight cooperation in digital technology, innovation, cross-border data flows and clean energy as areas likely to shape future growth across the Asia-Pacific.
These initiatives should not be viewed merely as economic cooperation programmes. They also form part of the competition to shape the rules governing the digital economy in the years ahead.
US–China competition is no longer confined to the question of which country produces the most advanced semiconductors. It encompasses digital infrastructure, technical standards, artificial intelligence governance and cross-border data transfers.
Beijing recognises that industrial capacity alone will not guarantee future economic influence. Countries that help establish technological standards and develop communications networks and digital platforms can shape the economic choices of other states for decades.
This does not mean, however, that Asia-Pacific economies will automatically adopt Chinese standards. Many maintain extensive technological and commercial relationships with the United States, Japan, South Korea and Europe, and seek to avoid excessive dependence on any single power.
The contest over the digital economy will therefore remain open and may ultimately prove more consequential for the international balance of power than some traditional trade disputes.

The Yuan Enters the Contest: China’s Economy Faces a Test of Stability

China’s economic instruments extend beyond trade, minerals and technology. They also include monetary policy, exchange-rate management and capital flows.
Against the backdrop of trade tensions with the United States, managing the yuan has acquired particular importance. A rapid appreciation could undermine the competitiveness of Chinese exports, while a sharp depreciation could increase the risk of capital outflows and financial-market instability.
Chinese monetary authorities employ a range of instruments to manage these competing pressures, including reserve requirements on foreign-currency deposits, which influence liquidity within the banking system.
Interpreting every Chinese monetary intervention as the opening of a currency war, however, would be an oversimplification. Central banks intervene in foreign-exchange markets for several reasons, including monetary stability, liquidity management and the containment of volatility.
The more significant point is that China is attempting to shield its economy from the consequences of international competition without sacrificing financial stability.
While the United States employs tariffs and technological restrictions, Beijing retains a wider range of instruments spanning monetary policy, supply chains and trade and investment relationships.
Negotiations between Washington and Beijing therefore concern more than trade alone. They also test each economy’s capacity to withstand the costs of competition over an extended period.

Moscow and Beijing: A Strategic Partnership That Does Not Eliminate Divergent Interests

It is tempting to regard Russia and China as a unified front against the United States. Such a view, however, overlooks important differences in their economic interests.
Russia, facing extensive Western sanctions, needs to expand its Asian markets, particularly in energy. China benefits from access to Russian oil and gas on favourable commercial terms but has little interest in allowing dependence on a single energy supplier to become a strategic vulnerability.
This dynamic is evident in negotiations over the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. For Moscow, the project offers an opportunity to expand gas exports eastwards. Beijing regards it as one option within a broader strategy of diversifying energy supplies.
China can negotiate prices, volumes and investment conditions from a more flexible economic position, while Russia faces a greater need to secure long-term markets.
This divergence does not necessarily weaken the Russia–China partnership, but it demonstrates that the relationship is not an economic alliance in which interests coincide entirely.
The distinction is especially relevant to the Shenzhen summit. Beijing is unwilling to sacrifice its commercial relationship with the United States in defence of every Russian demand, just as Moscow does not necessarily share China’s priorities in trade and technology.
Washington may consequently find opportunities to negotiate separately with each power. It cannot, however, assume that economic differences between Moscow and Beijing are sufficient to dismantle their strategic partnership.

Nuclear Weapons: Common Ground That Other Conflicts Have Failed to Provide

While understandings over Ukraine and Iran proved elusive, the reduction of nuclear risks emerged as an area in which the three leaders appeared more willing to engage.
Trump emphasised the particular responsibility borne by the United States, Russia and China in reducing nuclear risks, while Xi stressed the importance of preventing nuclear war and maintaining channels of dialogue among the major powers.
This is hardly surprising. However intense their rivalry, the leading nuclear powers share an interest in preventing a direct confrontation that could spiral beyond control.
The issue acquired additional urgency following the expiry of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia in February 2026, leaving the two countries without an equivalent binding framework limiting their strategic nuclear arsenals.
Reaching a new agreement will nevertheless be difficult. Washington seeks to bring China into broader arms-control arrangements, while Beijing argues that the considerable disparity between its arsenal and those of the United States and Russia makes equivalent obligations inequitable.
Agreement on the need to avoid nuclear war therefore represents limited political progress. It is not equivalent to an agreement to reduce arsenals or establish new verification mechanisms.
Even so, the significance of this issue extends beyond its immediate outcomes. It demonstrates that the major powers can identify common interests in preventing strategic catastrophe even when they cannot agree on how to resolve regional conflicts.

Who Emerged as the Winner in Shenzhen?

Measured against the prospect of major agreements, none of the three parties appears to have secured a decisive victory. Judged by political and diplomatic gains, however, the picture is more nuanced.
China benefited from hosting an unprecedented meeting on its own territory and presented itself as a power capable of bringing together some of the international system’s principal rivals. These gains reinforce Beijing’s international standing and its ambition to position itself as a centre for economic and political dialogue.
Russia secured a diplomatic gain through its participation in high-level international discussions despite continuing Western sanctions and disagreements over Ukraine. Yet the announced outcomes provided no specific sanctions relief or security arrangements meeting Moscow’s demands.
For the United States, the meeting allowed Trump to demonstrate the potential of direct diplomacy in managing crises and created space for continued dialogue with Moscow and Beijing. The absence of tangible agreements on Ukraine and Iran, however, limits the extent to which the summit can be described as a strategic breakthrough.
The summit therefore delivered different political benefits to each participant without fundamentally altering the balance of power or the course of the conflicts.
More importantly, the meeting revived concerns among smaller states that understandings between major powers might disregard the interests of countries directly affected by the crises under discussion.

The Global Economy After Shenzhen: Political De-escalation Is Not Enough

The summit’s outcomes alone are unlikely to produce an immediate change in the outlook for the global economy. Markets respond less to diplomatic photographs than to decisions that alter the costs of production, trade and financing.
The announced results contained no arrangements sufficient to end disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, remove sanctions associated with the war in Ukraine or resolve technological disputes between the United States and China.
The uncertainty confronting businesses and investors will therefore remain closely tied to developments in these areas.
Continued dialogue could nevertheless reduce some risks if it produces enforceable agreements. Stable navigation through the Gulf could lower insurance and freight costs, while easing trade restrictions could improve companies’ ability to plan investment and production.
Conversely, persistent tensions may encourage businesses to spend more on diversifying supply chains, maintaining larger inventories and relocating some operations to alternative markets.
Such costs do not always materialise as a sudden financial crisis. They accumulate gradually through declining economic efficiency, higher operating expenses and weaker productivity.
The global economy may consequently enter a period characterised not necessarily by a collapse in international trade, but by a persistently higher cost of managing geopolitical risks.
The result is a paradox the major powers may find increasingly difficult to ignore: they are using the instruments of the global economy to strengthen their strategic influence, yet excessive reliance on those instruments as weapons risks undermining the growth opportunities on which their economic strength depends.

Iraq and the Gulf States: Between Disrupted Supplies and Falling Oil Prices

For the Gulf states, any successful international understanding that reduces tensions with Iran would bring clear economic benefits, particularly for investment, tourism, trade and logistics.
Major projects intended to diversify Gulf economies require a stable environment in which capital, technology, labour and services can flow freely.
Regional stability, however, may also create a different challenge for oil-exporting countries if a reduction in geopolitical risk leads to lower prices. The relationship between de-escalation and economic gains is therefore not straightforward: the investment climate may improve even as oil revenues come under pressure.
Iraq faces an even more delicate dilemma.
Most of its seaborne oil exports depend on southern terminals connected to the Gulf, leaving the country exposed to disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, any substantial fall in oil prices directly affects government revenue and its capacity to finance public expenditure.
Iraq could therefore suffer during escalation if export volumes are disrupted, while also facing fiscal pressure during de-escalation if prices fall without a sufficient increase in export volumes.
This dilemma cannot be resolved through international understandings alone.
Iraq needs to develop alternative export routes, expand its oil storage and transportation capacity, strengthen non-oil revenues and reduce the exposure of public finances to external shocks.
In this context, oil pipeline projects linking Iraq to the Mediterranean or the Red Sea assume strategic importance, including proposed routes through Iraqi and Jordanian territory. Such projects must, however, be subject to rigorous economic and security feasibility assessments rather than treated as alternatives that can be implemented immediately.
Iraq and the Gulf states also need stronger regional economic and security cooperation, since the long-term stability of maritime routes cannot be guaranteed solely through understandings among the major powers.

Can Understandings Be Turned into Deals?

The significance of the Shenzhen summit did not end when the leaders departed. The real test of its outcomes will emerge over the coming months, as it becomes clear whether broad political statements can be translated into specific agreements.
If structured negotiations begin on nuclear arms control, practical arrangements emerge to reduce tensions in the Gulf, or new trade understandings are reached between Washington and Beijing, the summit may come to be regarded as the starting point of a broader diplomatic process.
If, however, the results remain confined to political declarations while wars and trade and technological restrictions continue unchanged, the summit’s impact will amount more to reopening communication channels than reshaping international relations.
Limited understandings linking certain issues may nevertheless emerge. Cooperation on energy security could create opportunities for economic incentives, while progress in US–Russian relations might improve prospects for dialogue on other conflicts.
Moving from partial understandings to grand bargains will, however, require clearly defined interests, credible implementation guarantees and the participation of those directly concerned.
The question to watch, therefore, is not whether the three powers will announce another historic deal, but whether they can transform their rivalry into a relationship that is more manageable and less vulnerable to uncontrolled escalation.

Negotiating Crises Without Agreeing on Their Resolution

The Shenzhen summit offered no definitive answer to whether the war in Ukraine could be traded against the Iranian crisis or maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. It did, however, illuminate the character of the current international order, in which the need for understanding among the major powers is growing even as their disagreements deepen.
The United States cannot disregard China’s economic weight or Russia’s military influence. China needs stability in markets, energy and technology, while Russia seeks to ease economic pressures and strengthen its position in international security arrangements.
Yet these interests do not automatically add up to a single bargain.
Developments surrounding the summit demonstrated that economic competition does not cease when political dialogue begins. Washington continues to tighten controls on advanced technology; Beijing uses rare earths, monetary policy and trade relationships to protect its interests; and Moscow seeks to leverage its resources and strategic partnerships to improve its negotiating position.
Here lies the central paradox exposed by Shenzhen: the major powers are negotiating to reduce the costs of conflict while simultaneously developing the instruments that enable them to sustain those very conflicts.
In the near term, the world does not appear to be moving towards a comprehensive settlement that would reorder international relations around a new consensus between Washington, Beijing and Moscow. More likely is the emergence of limited understandings that permit cooperation on certain issues while competition continues elsewhere.
Such an approach may reduce the likelihood of direct confrontation among the major powers, but it offers no guarantee that regional conflicts will end or that their economic costs will cease spreading through the global economy.
Shenzhen may therefore mark the beginning of a period in which diplomacy centred on limited deals takes precedence over attempts at comprehensive settlement, and the ability to manage crises becomes more important than the ability to resolve them.
The world whose leaders gathered in Shenzhen was not one moving towards reconciliation. It was a world seeking to negotiate the boundaries of its conflicts, as the mounting costs of sustaining them increasingly threatened the interests of the competing powers themselves.
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