Silent Diplomacy: The Hidden Architecture of U.S.–Iran Negotiations

The trajectory of United States–Iran relations represent a distinctive case in international relations, as it cannot be reduced to a binary opposition between “diplomatic rupture versus the resumption of negotiations,” but rather constitutes a continuous system of indirect communication that has been operating since 1980 to the present day. Despite the formal severance of relations between the two countries, what is now referred to as “silent negotiations,” according to former advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister and strategic communication expert Ahmad Al-Rikaby*, constitutes the actual framework governing the management of this prolonged conflict.

As Al-Rikaby argues in his analysis “The Secret Channel Between the United States and Iran: Why Is Public Hostility a Bargaining Instrument?”, the question is no longer whether Washington and Tehran communicate, but rather how, where, and through which instruments this continuous communication takes place.

In this context, the central premise is that negotiations between the United States and Iran do not occur through embassies or conventional diplomatic channels, but through an invisible structure of intermediaries and backchannels. This form of diplomacy relies on “channels without official recognition,” in which messages are transmitted via third parties, intentions are tested through actions rather than declarations, and understandings are constructed away from media exposure. Switzerland has played a pivotal role as a daily diplomatic conduit for managing sensitive files, while the Sultanate of Oman has emerged as an engineering hub for indirect negotiation, particularly in the Muscat talks that later laid the groundwork for the nuclear agreement between 2012 and 2015, reflecting the existence of an implicit institutional architecture for this form of negotiation.

One of the core characteristics of this model, according to Al-Rikaby, is that any rapprochement between Washington and Tehran occurs without direct contact, as delegations operate separately and synchronously to avoid any public interaction that could generate domestic political costs for either side. This pattern enables the management of negotiations without direct political accountability before public opinion and preserves space for the revision or adjustment of positions without significant diplomatic losses. In parallel, indirect channels play a central role in transmitting political messages between the two sides, whereby regional intermediaries are used to convey communications that may include proposals, warnings, or negotiating conditions, as has occurred in several instances of communication transmitted between political leaderships via third parties in the region in recent years.

Economic Signals in Negotiation

In addition, financial and economic markets constitute an essential component of the indirect negotiation structure. The Iranian currency and gold markets in Tehran often react immediately to any political or diplomatic signal, thereby transforming the economy into an informal measurement tool for levels of tension or détente. Conversely, the United States employs economic pressure instruments, particularly sanctions, as a means of reshaping negotiation conditions and compelling the other party toward the negotiating table without direct acknowledgment. In this sense, the economy itself becomes a parallel language of negotiation alongside political discourse.

Actions over words

Furthermore, the nature of negotiations between the two parties is reflected in the increasing primacy of “actions” over “words.” The release of frozen funds or financial arrangements through intermediary states constitutes what may be described as “complete diplomatic sentences,” through which understandings are expressed without the need for written agreements or formal announcements. This renders diplomacy between the two countries closer to the management of incremental steps of understanding rather than the achievement of a comprehensive and final agreement.

Even during periods of military escalation, indirect communication channels have not ceased to operate. During phases of acute tension, as in certain events of 2025, mediation channels through countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan continued to transmit messages between the two parties, contributing to the containment of escalation and preventing its expansion into broader confrontation. This demonstrates that silent negotiation is not an alternative to conflict but rather an integral mechanism for its management even at its peak intensity.

The Continuous Architecture of Negotiation

According to Ahmad Al-Rikaby, the persistence of this negotiating system is explained by several fundamental factors. So-called “political denial” enables both parties to negotiate without incurring domestic political costs before public opinion or political institutions. This model also provides an internal equilibrium between the necessity of negotiation and the impossibility of publicly acknowledging it. Moreover, the multiplicity of intermediary channels is crucial in preventing the complete collapse of communication, while simultaneously allowing initiatives to be tested and withdrawn without formal commitments, rendering negotiations less risky and more flexible.

From an economic perspective, this form of negotiation generates gains for both parties, albeit in an unequal and indirect manner. The United States benefits from relative stability in global energy markets and employs negotiation as a tool for managing tensions without resorting to military expenditure. Iran, in turn, obtains opportunities for partial relief from economic pressure, whether through partial sanctions relief, indirect financial channels, or asset exchange arrangements. In both cases, the persistence of a “neither war nor peace” condition creates an economically manageable environment for both sides.

According to Al-Rikaby’s analytical perspective, this relationship does not persist despite division, but rather through it. Public hostility is not an obstacle to negotiation but a prerequisite for its continuation, as each side must preserve its domestic political image while simultaneously managing the relationship through invisible channels. Consequently, the objective is not the attainment of a comprehensive final settlement, but rather the management of a long-term conflict in a manner that prevents escalation and maintains equilibrium.

In conclusion, the United States–Iran relationship can be understood as a dual-layer diplomatic system: an overt layer used for political discourse and pressure, and a covert layer used for managing practical understandings. Between these two layers operate economic forces, intermediaries, and indirect signals, forming what may be described as a “continuous architecture of negotiation,” whose primary objective is not the resolution of the conflict, but rather the regulation of its tempo and its containment within manageable boundaries.

*Ahmad Al-Rikaby is a former advisor to the Iraqi prime minister, strategic communications advisor and former media CEO.